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To exit the Great Recession and initiate the transition towards a low carbon 
economy, we propose a public-private investment plan in the energetic transi-
tion of about 2 points per year of European GDP. The key concept of this plan 
is the opportunity to reconsider the criteria for public finances using, as the 
goal of stability a concept of public debt net of created public assets (in percent 
of GDP), instead of gross public debt. An impartial body (eg the European 
Commission) could assess ex post and ex ante the value of investments, creating 
the incentives for coherent and effective public expenditure policies.
1. The Great Recession and the great emergency
It is common to multiply the gloomy warnings about climate 
change and its consequences for the future. The Copenhagen 
conference failed to impose a mechanism to replace and expand 
the Kyoto Protocol. The commitment of a large number of coun-
tries, including the United States and China, not to let average 
global temperature to increase by more than 2°C compared to 
preindustrial levels was not followed by radical action. Yearly emis-
sions of per capita greenhouse gas emissions in developed 
countries have not been reduced, and no concrete mechanism 
seems to be able to make this happen. In particular, carbon taxes, 
and the price per ton of carbon are at very low levels. However, 
these levels of annual emissions (in Europe, about 12 Gt of 
CO2 equivalent per year and per capita, including emissions gener-
ated in the manufacture and transportation of goods and services) 
are well beyond the earth’s absorption capacity. Emissions’ growth 
in emerging markets (both because of raising living standard and of Revue de l’OFCE / Debates and policies – 134 (2014)
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level in developed countries and has led to a per capita emission 
level of more than 40 Gt CO2 equivalent, whereas climate stability 
would require yearly emissions of 10 Gt.1 Repeating a dramatic 
message ends up emptying it of its meaning, but one would have 
wished that, confronted with this policy inaction the “very serious 
persons” that Paul Krugman mocks would take the subject at heart 
when it became serious, and begun implement operating solu-
tions. According to the IEA (International Energy Agency, 2011), 
given the climate emergency, and the depreciation rates of existing 
machinery or buildings, each year of delay in the adoption of the 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction path will increase the future 
cost of adoption since it will force early scrapping of the non “low 
carbon” equipment.
The 2008 economic and financial crisis, also called the Great 
Recession, also legs us another disaster, namely the state of our 
economies, particularly in Europe. The sovereign debt crisis has 
triggered an unprecedented austerity for fear of a sudden stop of 
public debt financing in Europe. The possibility for financial 
markets to arbitrate between 18 public debts, all issued in euros, 
has forced some countries, in greater difficulty than others, to 
quickly reduce their public deficit. As fiscal multipliers were very 
high – because of the state of the financial system, of deflation 
expectations, and of private agents’ deteriorated balance sheets – 
cutting spending or raising taxes did not reduce debt and deficit as 
much as it was hoped. The synchronization of restrictive fiscal 
policy amplified the problem. As a result, public deficits were 
reduced very little, leaving the original problem (convincing finan-
cial markets) even worse than before. The implicit pooling of 
public debt in the euro zone ended the downward spiral of the 
euro; but high unemployment persists, together with economies 
on the verge of deflation. Therefore, the implicit mutualization 
1. Between 2000 and the date at which emissions are stabilized at 10 GteCO2 is stabilized, 
2000 GteCO2   can be emitted. We can therefore continue to emit at current rates (which 
implies an effort of reduction by developed countries to compensate for the convergence of 
living standards and emissions of emerging countries) until 2050. Beyond that date we will 
need to emit around one ton of CO2 equivalent per capita. (GIEC, 2007, International Energy 
Agency, 2011).
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the eurozone.
On the eve of the European elections of May 2014 and of the 
Parties climate conference of Paris in November and December 
2015, all leverage available to engage on a path of significant green-
house emissions reduction is an absolute imperative. Finding a way 
to make the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions compatible 
with exiting the crisis appears to be unavoidable. The purpose of 
this brief is to try to link these two issues so as to emerge from the 
pernicious logic that under the false pretext that we need not to 
leave debt to our children, fails to give them a habitable planet.
2. What the 2008 crisis leaves us
The reduction of economic activity and of public deficits had a 
considerable impact on public investment and residential invest-
ment in developed countries, particularly in the eurozone.
Reducing investment does not generally result in the improvement 
of an agent’s balance sheet, since today’s foregone expenditure is 
largely offset by the need of compensating future invest-
ment. Cutting investment in physical assets may also result in 
crossing the “collapse threshold”, which will require higher invest-
ment in the future than what was currently saved. In the case of 
education, a cut in the flow of investment is irreversible, as genera-
tions who have received little or poor education do not return to 
school in the future. This is why intelligent budget rules allow a 
special treatment of investment, or correct the measure of public 
deficit with the change in value of net assets (public or global). A 
reduction in the gross deficit resulting in an equal deterioration of 
net assets, does not improve financial sustainability.
However, in the Great Recession, in many countries, both 
public investment and housing investment were cut. Figure 1 
shows public investment as a percent of potential output as 
defined by the OECD (in this case the EO93 database of May 
2013.2 The OECD estimated slowdown in potential growth since 
2. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/data/oecd-economic-outlook-statistics-and-
projections/oecd-economic-outlook-no-93_data-00655-en?isPartOf=/content/datacollection/eo-
data-en
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able and largely reduces the effect of cutting public investment. If 
we had retained and extended the 2007 OECD estimate of poten-
tial growth, then the reduction of the ratio appears more 
severe. Figure 1 shows that public investment was cut from 2010 
and the years 2011 to 2013 saw this trend continue.
Table 1 details the share of public investment reduction in the 
structural budget consolidation effort made between 2009 and 
2013 and identifies the countries that have used the final public 
investment as a means of adjust their public finances. In most 
countries, public investment, measured relative to potential GDP, 
decreased. Part of this decrease results from the revision of poten-
tial GDP (in the Eurozone, potential GDP has been revised by 10%, 
so the investment to GDP ratio is decreased by 0.06% GDP), but, 
nevertheless, public investment did decrease, in some countries 
strongly. In the crisis countries the pre-crisis period was character-
ized by high public investment, but net investment is today 
clearly negative in crisis, the period before 2007 was very auspi-
cious in terms of public investment but is now negative net 
investment in these countries. At the euro area level the reduction 
of public investment is 0.6 percent of GDP compared to 0.7 in the 
United States. A recovery of public investment is needed to offset 
Figure 1. Public net investment in percentage of potential activity
Source: Economic Outlook, 93, May 2013.
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A green “New Deal” to boost Europe 225the depreciation that is in progress. This recovery should be 
colored of green.
Housing investment has the same profile, as Figure 2 shows. At 
the euro zone level, nearly 2 percentage points of GDP of housing 
investment were lost (almost 2.5 percentage points in the 
USA). The fall in housing investment is related to the collapse of 
real estate markets, to real estate bubbles bursts in some countries 
(notably the United States and Spain) and to reduced bank loans to 
households. This decline followed a long period of stability (since 
1990, gross investment in housing fluctuates at around 
6 percentage points of GDP in the Eurozone and 5.5 in the United 
States; the real estate bubble has led to increased investment of 1 
percentage point of GDP in the United States against a less than 
half a percentage point in the Eurozone). The correction is severe 
and investment today lags behind the needs implied by demo-
graphics and existing capital depreciation. 
3. A “Green New Deal”
Supporting growth is a priority today. This must first and fore-
most rely on a public investment plan, reversing the trend 
described above, and supporting the also urgent energy transi-
tion. A second pillar should be a recovery of private investment in 
residential housing, needed to ensure sufficient housing, and to 
make the transition to an energy efficient housing stock. These two 
Table 1. Share of structural effort imputed to the decline in net public investment
USA GBR EUZ DEU FRA ITA ESP NLD PRT IRL
% Structural effort given 
by investment 14 -9 17 6 10 23 46 10 29 9
Public investment,% 
potential GDP (1990-2007) 1.2 0.6 0.6 -0.1 0.8 0.6 2.0 0.9 1.7 2.6
Public investment,% 
potential GDP (2013) 0.5 0.9 0.0 -0.2 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 0.6 -0.6 0.5
OECD potential revision 
2013-2007, in % -7 -12 -13 -10 -10 -14 -22 -11 -16 -35
The first line reads as follows: For a budget restriction of 1 percentage point of GDP in the United States, public invest-
ment in the United States has been reduced by 0.14 percentage point of GDP compared to the average ratio of 
public investment to potential GDP in the years 1990-2007.
Sources: Economic Outlook, 93, author's calculations. 
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crisis and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
In the iAGS 2014 report (OFCE, 2013) we detail a public invest-
ment plan in energy transition. Table 2 gives an overview. This 
plan was put together drawing from materials such as white papers 
or Roadmaps published by the European Commission or the Euro-
pean Union. The iAGS 2014 report estimated the required 
investment surplus compared to a “business as usual” scenario. 
When investments in energy transition come in substitution of 
regular investments, there is no accounting of extra investment. 
The numbers in table 2 refer to extra investment over business as 
usual investment, and not, as usually, numbers generally presented 
as gross investment.
Such a package could increase investment in the euro area of an 
amount between 150 and 200 euro billions, i.e. between 1.4 and 
2 percentage points of GDP, if we add to the energy transition a 
recovery of public investment towards the pre-crisis trends. 
Combined with fiscal multipliers still high (especially considering 
that investment would be made more than proportionally in coun-
tries in crisis), one would expect this package to boost the European 
economy for about 2 percentage points of GDP. Although insuffi-
Figure 2. Private residential investment as percentage of potential activity
Source: Economic Outlook, 93, May 2013.
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great step forward.
4. Financed by public debt
The financing of such a package is the key to its impact on the 
economy. The proposal here is to primarily finance it through 
public debt. This idea may seem shocking when, at least at first 
sight, the sovereign debt crisis in the euro zone was due to exces-
sive public debt. Yet the public investment implied by this package 
has a positive net worth since it allows preparing for the energy 
transition. This positive net value is computed on the basis of a 
widely studied implicit price for the ton of carbon depends. Given 
today’s low sovereign interest rates, the target price needs not to be 
very high (less than 50 euros per tCO2). The built infrastructures 
should target profitability. Various instruments can be used for this 
aim. The objective would to make explicit the price, so far implicit, 
of a ton of carbon, either through emissions rights trading or 
through a carbon tax. Standards, legal obligations or tax incentives 
may be other instruments to change incentives and behaviors.
In the case of buildings energy efficiency, financing is not 
necessarily public. To overcome blockages generally recognized 
that prevent positive net value investment to be realized, we 
propose third party investors schemes, in which specific agencies 
carry the debt related to investments and finance it through the 
realized energy savings. This can be combined with tax incen-
tives. Even in this case, a price per ton of carbon helps to increase 
the profitability of investment. This debt would not be public, but 
Table 2. Green New Deal
Billions of Euros per year
Annual investment 
EA17
Annual investment
EU28 
 “Low carbon” Transeuropean Transport 
Network (TEN-T) 50.7 80.00
European Integrated Electric networks 6.65 9.39
Renewable energy production 26.83 40.60
Buildings’ thermal renovation 48.43 64.31
Total 132.61 (1.4% of GDP) 194.30 (1.5% of GDP)
Sources: iAGS Report 2014 from (EC, 2007, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; ENTSO-E, 2012; EREC (European Renewable 
Energy Council), 2011, ETUC, 2013, “The EU climate and energy package – European Commission”, nd).
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ability), a public guaranteed can be designed, through large and 
regulated institutions.
5. Conclusion: how to control public investment?
The crisis was accompanied by a slowdown in investment at a 
moment in which, for a reasonable estimate of the implicit price of 
carbon reasonable, investment in the energy transition would be 
most needed and convenient. Low sovereigns rates in the euro area 
make financing this investment easy, and its sustainability is guar-
anteed by the accumulation of assets and unchanged net debt. The 
value of these assets will depend on the implicit price of carbon but 
explicit price changes may also be required as changes in behavior 
are likely to require strong price signals.
It remains that the proposal to increase debt may seem at odds 
with the current trend of public deficit reduction. The paradox is 
that fiscal rules in the EU focus on an irrelevant criterion, gross 
debt, instead of taking into account the correct measure, that is 
debt net of accumulated assets. Measuring the latter, however, 
requires an assessment of the value of these assets and the assess-
ment can be problematic because it is based on a projection into the 
future, of the return of the investment, but also of the changes in 
behavior induced by policies changes. For instance building freight 
railway transportation infrastructure is easy. But the value of such 
infrastructures depends on the quality of connection opened, the 
density of the network and the matching with flows of freight. A 
well-designed infrastructure will only have value if it is used and if 
the transport by road turns out to be more expensive than transport 
by rail. This can be done through an environmental tax, higher 
tolls, a ban on road transit or subsidies to rail transport. But without 
at least one of these accompanying policies, the new infrastructure 
may fail to capture traffic and therefore have no value.
The risk is that to revive our economies, heavy investment is 
undertaken where it is easy to invest rather than where it is appro-
priate. A number of schemes to stimulate investment (whether 
residential or infrastructure) are done with this perspective, and 
then suffer from low profitability. The European Commission has 
a potentially important tool to overcome this flaw. Current fiscal 
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incentive to reduce investment. If budget criteria were softened for 
investments with positive net worth, in an intelligent golden rule, 
the Commission could have a dialogue with European government 
on a project by project basis. In assessing a posteriori, the effective-
ness of investment, both in itself and concerning accompanying 
policies, the European Commission could control the quality of 
investments, avoiding the pitfall of grandiose but inadequate 
constructions. This would be a new instrument of public finance 
management in Europe and a way out of the absurd public debt 
hunting, including when it originates in necessary investment.
Some concrete proposals to overcome the crisis and at the same 
time address the urgency of energy transitions could be:
— Revive European economies through a public and private 
investment plan of about 2 percentage points of GDP per 
year, broken down as follows:
■ Public investment in the transition to low carbon 
economy, of the order of one percentage point of GDP per 
year;
■ End of under-investment in existing infrastructure (around 
0.5 percentage points of GDP);
■ Stimulus by various mechanisms of energy transition in 
the residential sector (around 0.5 percent of GDP).
— Partially finance the plan with public debt by amending the 
treaty provisions on stability and growth, so that govern-
ments need to target debt net of asset creation instead of 
gross debt. This goes along with proposals on introducing a 
golden rule;
— Support the investment plan with any tool that ensures its 
profitability (tax policies, emission rights, fiscal policies, 
taxation, subsidies or standards);
— Give a (trusted) third party the ex ante and ex post assessment 
of the value of public investment for the calculation of net 
debt to guarantee the policy coherence and effectiveness of 
proposed investments.

